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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
LA VOR J. COATES 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant 
Case No. 1 7344 
MARY COATES 
Defendant-
Respondent 
* * * 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-husband appeals the distribution of the property 
of the parties and an alimony award, as determined by the trial court, 
and set forth by the Decree of Divorce entered by the court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the trial of this matter, the court entered its decree, 
wherein the property of the parties was distributed in accordance 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the findings of the court. In addition, the court entered an award 
of alimony in favor of the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to have the property disposition 
set aside and reversed, and the matter remanded to the district court 
for reconsideration of the property division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on June 26, 1969, and lived as 
husband and wife until their separation on approximately December 3, 
197 5. One minor child was born as issue of the marriage. 
The court found that each party had brought to the marriage 
certain property (R-180), the plaintiff having brought into the marriage 
a truck and camper shell, stock worth approximately $630, a Credit 
Union account of approximately $2, 100, an investment account of 
approximately $1, 000, and his personal possessions. That defendant 
brought to the marriage a home on Bryan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah; $4, 000 cash; furniture; a 1966 Chevrolet automobile, and 
2 
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her personal possessions. 
The transcript shows that plaintiff testified that he brought 
into the marriage a pickup truck, a crunper, a boat, a 1963 Chevrolet 
automobile, stock with a value of $630. 54, a checking account with a 
balance of $3, 807, a Credit Union accoWlt with a balance of $2, 100, 
and a mutual fund investment of $1, 200 (T-73, 74, 75, 76). Further, 
the transcript shows that the defendant brought to the marriage a 
1966 Chevrolet automobile, and an interest in a home on Bryan 
Avenue (T-76). Plaintiff testified that the home on Bryan Avenue 
was later deeded by defendant's parents to both plaintiff and the 
defendant (T- 77), and that the parties did extensive remodeling to 
said home (T-77), after which the house was sold, and approximately 
$20, 200 applied towards the purchase of the parties home on ThWlder-
bird Drive (T-79). 
Durin r the marriage, the parties, in addition to acquiring 
the home ~n Thunderbird Drive, traded plaintiff's pickup truck for a 
1961 pickup truck (T-79), sold plaintiff's boat, and used the proceeds 
to purchase a Sea Ray boat (T-83), purchase a vacant lot in Granger, 
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Utah (T-79); purchased furniture (T-85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91); 
and accumulated and purchased jewelry (T-94, 95.) In addition, the 
parties accumulated two 1977 Buick automobiles (T-105, 133), 
having sold the two Chevrolet automobiles brought into the marriage 
(T-107.) 
In addition to the accumulation of the foregoing property, 
the evidence established that plaintiff had a Credit Union account of 
approximately $6, 000 (T-116; Ex. 44-D, 45-P), and a retirement 
account of approximately $3, 000 (T-98; Ex. 16-D.) Defendant had 
acquired an ffiA retirement account of $7, 500. The parties also 
purchased and owned some stock, part of which was sold about the 
time of the separation of the parties (T-121, 132.) 
Defendant testified that her father had assisted the parties 
financially during the years of the marriage, and that there was 
$7, 500 owed to him (T-142.) This amount represented $1, 500 used 
to purchase the vacant lot in Granger, and $6, 000 borrowed to 
remodel the Thunderbird Drive home. 
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The court, after presentation of the evidence, found that 
~he home on Thunderbird Drive was valued at $148, 0'00 (R-179), with 
no outstanding encumbrances; that plaintiff's pension plan with Hughes 
Airwest had an approximate value of $3, 300; that defendant's ffiA 
account was approximately $7, 000 (R-180); and that certain bills 
existed, including $7, 500 to defendant's father; however, according 
to the exhibits presented (44-D and 45-P), the total property 
accumulated by the parties consisted of additional properties not 
considered by the court in its Findings of Fact. Values of these 
properties, as shown by the exhibits, are: 
VALUE BY VALUE BY 
ruM PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
Home - 2759 Thunderbird $ 170,000.00 $ 148, 100.00 
Building lot - Granger 15, 000. 00 22, 500. 00 
Boat 10,900.00 13, 000. 00 
Pickup and camper 2, 000. 00 2, 700. 00 
Furniture and personal 
property 37, 822. 00 None 
Jewelry of defendant 16, 000. 00 to 
25,000.00 None 
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VALUE BY VALUE BY 
ITEM PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
Jewelry of plaintiff $ 300. 00 to $ 
500.00 500.00 
Stock owned and/ or sold 8 55. 00 3, 084. 00 
Stocks in possession 1, 500. 00 to 
3,000.00 1,712.00 
Retirement accounts 3,000.00 7, 200. 00 
Savings or Credit Union 
accounts 6,000.00 None 
TOTALS 
(Smallest claimed) $ 263, 277. 00 $ 187, 096. 00 
Notwithstanding the amounts claimed by the parties, the 
court in its Conclusions of Law and in the Decree of Divorce made a 
disposition of the property. It is from this property disposition that 
plaintiff appeals. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I. THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS. 
POINT II. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS. 
In its Findings of Fact, the court did not find a value of all 
or the property of the parties, but found a value for only the home 
on Thunderbird Drive. In making the division of property, the court 
did not consider the defendant's own testimony that she felt that a 
60/ 40 division of the house would be fair (T-139). Considering the 
values as established by the testimony and exhibits, and applying 
defendant's values, the decree awards the property, as follows: 
TO PLAINTIFF: TO DEFENDANT: 
Home lien $ 27,000.00 Home $ 115,100.00 
($148, 100. 00, 
Building lot 21,000.00 less lien, and 
(value less less $6, 000. 00 
$1, 500. 00 to to defendant's 
defendant's father) 
father) 
Boat 13,000.00 
Truck/ camper 2,700.00 
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TO PLAINTIFF: 
Pension plan 
Credit Union 
Stock proceeds 
Jewelry 
$ 3, 200. 00 
6,000.00 
855.00 
500.00 
$ 68, 655. 00 
TO DEFENDANT: 
$ 7, 000. 
$ 122, JOO. I 
Thus, it can be seen that the court, without considering the value oi 
defendant's household furniture, jewelry and stock, awarded the 
defendant 64o/o of the assets of the marriage. Had the court consider; 
that the furniture had the value placed by plaintiff at $37, 722. 00; the 
plaintiff's jewelry at $16, 000. 00; and her stock at $4, 796. 08, the 
amount she was awarded would then be $180, 618. 08, and the ratio 
would then be: plaintiff - 27o/o, and defendant - 73%. 
While it is recognized that no fixed formula exists by whic~ 
the court is required to distribute the assets of a marriage, the 
disposition should be fair, equitable, and necessary for the parties. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218. 
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Since the marital estate is evaluated according to the 
existing property interests at the time the matter is heard by the 
court, appellant contends that the court should have considered 
the value of all of the marital assets, including furniture, jewelry 
and stock values. See Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P. 2d 326; 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P. 2d 235. The court, in making its 
division, did not consider these items, although they constituted 
a very substantial part of the assets accumulated during the 
marriage. 
The court in its Conclusions of Law indicated _that the 
division of the home was made after a consideration of the credits 
and offsets to which each party may be entitled. Assuming that 
the court considered as an offset, in favor of defendant, the work 
performed by her father, all of which •_vas done during the 
marriage, it would appear that this claim has no more validity 
than did the defendant's claim for labor performed by him in the 
case of Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra. Thus, considering the 
9 
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value of the home, the fact that it was unencumbered, and the facr 
that the parties had both worked toward its acquisition, it appears 
that the disposition by the court was neither fair, equitable or 
necessary for the parties, and was an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
Appellant further contends that the court abused its 
discretion in its division of property, by not considering the 
marital misconduct of the defendant. It is acknowledged that the 
settlement of property should not impose a punishment on either 
party; however, marital misconduct often is considered by the 
court in making an equitable division of property. See Wilson v. 
Wilson, 1956 Ut, 296 P. 2d 977. 
In the matter of Read v. Read, 1979 Ut, 594 P. 2d 871, 
this court said: 
It is well established that the trial court has 
considerable discretion in the allocation of the 
property and financial resources of the parties. 
Nevertheless, this discretion is not entirely 
without limit. 
In the case before us, it appears that the trial 
court's property award may reflect a degree of 
10 
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punishment against the defendant for his extra-
marital conduct and relative "guilt" in bringing 
about the dissolution of the marriage. A trial 
court must consider many factors in making 
a property settlement in a divorce proceeding, 
but the purpose of the settlement should not be 
to impose punishment upon either party. 
It appears, notwithstanding the fact that defendant's conduct 
caused the marriage to fail, that the court did not consider this 
and, in fact, by its distribution of the property, effectively punished 
the appellant. An equal distribution of all of the assets would have 
more realistically and more equitably solved the problems faced 
by the court. 
Considering the facts of this case, appellant submits that 
it is reasonable for this court to exercise its own prerogative and 
modify the Decree of Divorce to provide for a distribution of 
assets that will more reasonably serve the desired objective of 
making the best possible allocation of the property to allow the 
parties to readjust their lives. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO DEFENDANT. 
11 
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Appellant recognizes that the amount, if any, of 
attorney's fees awarded to a wife in a divorce case, rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court; however, it is submitted that 
such an award must be based both upon the financial need of the 
wife and upon the ability of the husband to pay. It is also recog-
nized that the wife is not entitled to free litigation, and that the 
court should consider this fact. 
Here, the defendant wife was awarded a substantial 
portion of the assets of the marriage and, in addition, was 
awarded alimony in the sum of $400 per month for a period of 
one year. This award was made, although defendant was receiving 
unemployment compensation of $137 per week (T-130), and had 
been working at a salary of $2, 500 per month (T-152, 178). There 
was neither a showing by the defendant or a finding by the court 
that defendant-wife was in need of assistance for the payment oi 
attorney's fees, nor was there a showing by the defendant or a 
finding by the court that the wife was financially unable to pay her 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
... 
own attorney's fees. From the facts, it is also obvious that the 
financial resources of the appellant husband would be severely 
burdened by the court's award of attorney's fees. 
This court addressed this question in the case of 
Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Ut. 353, 179 P. 2d 1005, wherein the court 
said: 
... that awards of attorney's fees and expenses 
of suit may be made by the trial court ... , 
providing the necessity for such awards is found 
to exist. (Emphasis mine. ) 
Again, the court in Adams v. Adams, Ut 1979, 593 P. 2d 
147, said: 
An award of attorney's fees is largely discretionary 
with this court, and as the record shows that 
plaintiff is working and earning money, and does 
not disclose any necessity on the part of the plaintiff 
for such award or her inability to pay her own 
attorney's fees . . . (Emphasis mine. ) 
There is nothing before the court that would indicate 
defendant-wife's inability to pay her own fees, or a necessity 
requiring the husband to pay them; on the contrary, the wife 
not only had assets, but also had income sufficient to pay these 
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expenses. Accordingly, it is submitted that the trial court 
abused its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees of 
$1, 500. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the disposition of assets made by the court, 
together with the award of attorney's fees, seems to show that tlle 
trial court did not fully consider the contributions of the parties 
to the accumulation of marital assets, nor did the court 
consider the facts underlying the divorce. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should review 
and revise the division of property so that a more reasonable 
and realistic distribution will exist. Appellant believes that 
the most applicable method would be to increase- his interest in 
the home to an amount that would reflect an equitable distribution 
of all of the marital assets. 
Further, it is submitted that the court should reverse 
the lower court's award of attorney's fees to the defendant, 
based upon the facts which clearly show the lack of her need 
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for such award, and also show her absolute ability to pay these 
fees. 
/J 7 71!: Respectfully submitted this-~&~~----- day of 
March 1981. 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Mailed three (3) copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
Kent !VI. Kasting, Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, 1000 Boston 
Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
.::;' '7 !7/' day of March 1981, 
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